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ABSTRACT  
The concomitant transformations of compensation policies and the wage collective bargaining system over 
the course of recent decades invite comparison between the two: how far are changes in pay practices and 
patterns of wage collective bargaining connected? How do actors bargain given complex and diverse 
compensation policies? These issues are examined on the basis of the French REPONSE 2004-2005 survey 
and two case studies carried out in the automotive sector and four call centres. Six compensation policy 
profiles are firstly identified, from the simplest to the most complex. Our results then emphasise that the 
diversity of compensation policies is echoing the variety of collective bargaining. Besides, they underline the 
impact of collective bargaining depends on compensation policies. Finally, we stress that several factors 
limit collective bargaining margins, or at least are used as such: individualisation of pay practices, directives 
from parent companies or contractors, as well as the statutory minimum wage.  
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Diversidad de Política de Compensación y Negociación colectiva de 
Salario en Francia 
 
 
RESUMEN 
Las transformaciones de las políticas retributivas y del sistema de negociación colectiva a lo largo de las 
últimas décadas invita a una comparación entre estas: ¿hasta qué punto los cambios en las prácticas 
salariales están vinculados con las tendencias en la negociación colectiva? A partir del estudio francés 
REPONSE 2004-5, dos estudios de caso llevados a cabo en el sector de automoción y cuatro centros de 
llamada, se examinan estos aspectos. Se identifican, en primer lugar, seis perfiles de políticas retributivas, 
del más simple al más complejo. Nuestros resultados ponen de manifiesto que la diversidad de políticas 
retributivas refleja la variedad en la negociación colectiva. Por otro lado, muestran que el impacto de la 
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negociación colectiva depende de las políticas retributivas. Finalmente, se destaca que varios factores limitan 
los márgenes de negociación colectiva, o al menos son usados como tal: individualización de las prácticas 
salariales, directivas de empresa matriz o contratista y el salario mínimo interprofesional.  
 
Palabras clave: políticas retributivas; negociación colectiva; sector de automoción; centros de llamadas.  
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Introduction 
 
The concomitant transformations of compensation policies and the wage 
collective bargaining system over the course of recent decades invites comparison 
between the two: how far are changes in pay practices and patterns of wage 
collective bargaining connected? In any given year, does the wage collective 
bargaining process in use in a particular firm reflect its use of pay practices? Do 
employer and employees representatives involved in the bargaining process discuss 
differently depending on the pay practices in use? 
Compensation policies in France have undergone considerable change since the 
early 1980s: following a trend towards individualisation of compensation in the 
1980s and 1990s, the new century saw a move towards greater complexity and 
diversification, as individualised pay came increasingly to be underpinned by 
collective and reversible pay practices such as bonuses based on collective 
performance and financial participation (Barrat, Chaput, Naboulet and Wolff, 2007). 
These transformations coincided with major changes in the wage collective 
bargaining system, lending support to the hypothesis of a challenge to the extant 
hierarchy between the two levels of wage collective bargaining that were strongly 
present in France: the sector-level and the firm-level1. While collective bargaining 
at sector-level, based on minimum wage legislation, has been at the heart of wage 
_____________ 
 
1 A third level for establishing wages can be added: the interprofessional level that fixes 
the statutory national minimum wage. Given that the rules governing its review (tied in with 
changes in purchasing power and inflation) are strictly overseen by the State and are not the 
result of a collective bargaining process per se, this paper focuses on the collective 
bargaining process at sector and compagny levels. 
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regulation since the Act of 11 February 19502, the Auroux Acts of 1982, which 
introduced compulsory annual bargaining on wages, working hours, and work 
organisation, led to an ongoing expansion in bargaining at firm-level. This process 
developed yet further in the late 1990s with the implementation of the 35-hour 
working time and the introduction of numerous laws designed to encourage 
decentralised collective bargaining (Bloch-London, Pélisse, 2008; Naboulet, 2011). 
Interestingly, these laws simultaneously fuelled bargaining at sector-level, giving 
the whole bargaining system a fresh vigour. This is the context underpinning this 
paper’s exploration of the relationships between wage collective bargaining 
processes and diversity in compensation policies. It also sheds new light on the 
effectiveness of wage collective bargaining at both sector-level and firm-level.  
The study draws on two levels of analysis. The first is statistical, based on the 
REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, while the second is qualitative, looking at two case 
studies of a firm in the automotive sector and four call centres (see box below). 
Combining the two sources gives a broad overview of the diversity of pay practices 
implemented by firms via a representative survey and an analysis of the practical 
processes of wage collective bargaining in two sectors. This paper is organised as 
follows. The first part outlines compensation policies within French establishments. 
Here, compensation policies are taken to mean the more or less complex 
combinations of pay practices – individualised and / or flexible or otherwise – in 
use in establishments. The typology thereby outlined foregrounds the diversity of 
compensation policies by defining six profiles, from the simplest (called “reduced” 
policy) to the most complex (called “mixed” policy). The second part then goes on 
to describe the process of wage collective bargaining. We discuss several aspects 
which support the hypothesis of a connection between the pay practices used within 
establishments and collective bargaining practices. The diversity of compensation 
policies is indeed echoing the variety of collective bargaining patterns. The third 
and final part of the paper raises the issue of the effectiveness of wage collective 
bargaining by studying its field of influence, underlining the fact that the impact of 
wage bargaining depends on the compensation policies in use. 
 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
2 In historical terms, sectors are at the heart of the French wage bargaining system. As it 
is described by Saglio (1991), the role of sectors is first of all to draw up collective 
agreements defining wage hierarchy and minima at sector-level, i.e. the wages below which 
an employer cannot pay an employee, while collective bargaining at firm-level focus rather 
on determining by how much wages should be increased. 
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Data and methodology 
 
The Relations professionnelles et négociations d’entreprise1 (REPONSE) 
survey for 2004-2005 focused on a series of aspects of labour relations in France, 
including the existence and functioning of bodies representing employees, 
collective bargaining processes, conflict resolution, and so on. The survey took 
data from a representative sample of 2,930 establishments in the private sector 
(excluding agriculture) with at least twenty employees. It compares the points of 
view of all stakeholders, taking responses from one management representative, 
one employee representative (where such a role existed) and a sample of 
employees. This paper focuses on the data provided by management 
representatives, since its aim is to explore the major themes related to wage 
collective bargaining (their existence, topics of collective bargaining, and the role 
given to collective agreements at sector-level) and to provide information on the 
characteristics of the establishments, such as their sector of activity, size, legal 
and capital structure, economic situation, human resources management, pay 
practices, and so on. 
Two case studies then flesh out the results of the statistical analysis by 
focusing closely on the wage collective bargaining process. The case studies were 
carried out in 2010 in two very different sectors: the automotive industry and call 
centres. The choice of firms is not intended to be representative, but rather meets 
a twofold aim: highlighting the specific characteristics of the bargaining process 
for two compensation policies, the other being more limited in scope insofar as 
wage review practices remain less widespread. The choice also aimed to establish 
profiles for firms typical of their sector: a large, long-established firm in the 
automotive industry and younger, mid-size companies in the business services 
sector in the case of the four call centres. In addition to interviews with union 
representatives who took part in the compulsory annual wage collective 
bargaining process, the article draws on the wage agreements at firm-level as well 
as profit sharing agreements implemented by the manufacturer since 2000. Not all 
of the dozen or so union representatives in the call centres were authorised to 
share such documents with the research team. Only two of the call centres were 
able to share significant data (on human resources policy reports, wage 
agreements at firm-level, and bonuses practices). Whatever the sector, senior 
management and HR directors did not wish to take part in the survey (for a 
detailed presentation of the firms in the study, see Castel et al., 2011). 
 
 
   1. The survey is comparable to the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS). For a comparable study, see Marsden and Belfield (2010). 
 
Nicolas Castel, Noélie Delahaie and Héloïse Petit                 Diversity of Compensation Policies and… 
 
Cuadernos de Relaciones Laborales  
Vol. 32, Núm. 2 (2014) 311-336 
 
315 
1. Diverse and complex compensation policies 
 
The REPONSE survey is a rich source for researchers aiming to draw up a 
detailed overwiew of pay practices in French establishments. It questions 
management representatives about their practices for reviewing wages (generalised 
and / or individualised pay increases) and granting bonuses (related to collective / 
individual performance) and stock options as well as profit-sharing system and 
company savings plans. The survey indicates if each practice is intended for 
managerial and / or non-managerial employees3. Table 1 categorises wage practices 
according to their degree of reversibility and individualisation. 
 
Note: Each pay practice can be categorised in terms of reversibility and individualisation of 
the compensation. For example, generalised pay increases are both collective, i. e. applying 
equally to all employees, and irreversible, in that the establishments undertakes to pay the 
wages, whether bargained with employee representatives or decided unilaterally by the 
employer. 
 
Reversible pay practices, which can vary in amount from year to year, include 
financial participation systems and performance-related bonuses, whether collective 
or individual. Firms may also promote an individual approach to compensation by 
using targeted pay increases, individual performance-related bonuses, and stock 
options. Unlike collective tools that apply to all employees, individualised pay 
practices allow companies to apply wage increases to selected employees, thereby 
increasing wage flexibility.  
The REPONSE survey for 2004-2005 reported that the full range of pay 
practices is to be found broadly across the French establishments, with the 
exception of stock options and pension funds. Only 1% of non-managerial staff and 
4.1% of managerial employees were granted stock options in 2004. On average, one 
_____________ 
 
3 However, it does not give in details the proportion of employees concerned, either by 
company or by professional category. 
Table 1. Pay practices 
 Collective Individual 
Irreversible Generalised pay increase Individualised pay increase 
Reversible 
Collective performance-related 
bonuses  
Profit-sharing, company savings 
plans and pension funds 
Individualised performance-
related bonuses  
Stock options 
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in ten companies offered pension funds. Cases where no wage increase was defined 
were rare: the main employees affected were managerial (14.3%) rather than non-
managerial (4%). These three types of pay practice were deemed insufficiently 
representative and were thus excluded from the following analysis. 
The results confirm the conclusions of earlier studies (Brochard, 2008): there is a 
strong tendency to differentiate practices along managerial / non-managerial lines 
(see the last column of table 2). Non-managerial employees receive irreversible pay 
increases more often than their managerial colleagues. 74.7% and 77.5% of 
establishments distribute generalised and individualised pay increases respectively 
for their non-managerial staff, as opposed to 53.1% and 68.2% for managerial staff. 
Conversely, reversible pay practices are widespread among managerial employees, 
especially individual performance-related bonuses: 63.5% of establishments 
surveyed granted one to this category of employee, as against 55.8% for non-
managerial staff. The difference is less obvious when it comes to collective 
performance-related bonuses (51.8% and 50.9% for managerial and non-managerial 
employees respectively).  
To reflect the diversity of compensation policies, we draw up a typology based 
on hierarchical ascendant classification (HAC). This typology groups together 
establishments according to their pay practices to define six establishment profiles, 
each corresponding to a specific compensation policy (table 2). Two clearly distinct 
clusters emerge: “mixed” versus “reduced” compensation policies applying to over 
17% and nearly 15% of establishments respectively (representing over 31% and 
10% of employees respectively). The first cluster is typical of establishments that 
draw on the full range of pay practices without significant differentiation between 
managerial and non-managerial employees. The second, the “reduced” policy, is 
typical of establishments that make little or no use of the practices in question. Here, 
pay practices are often individualised and reversible. A range of establishment 
profiles lies between these two groups. The “reversible” policy profile, representing 
10% of establishments and 9.5% of employees, makes very little use of generalised 
pay increases, whether for managerial or non-managerial employees. Here, 
reversible pay practices are heavily used. The third profile bases compensation 
policy on increasing base wages (i.e. generalised and individualised pay increases) 
and represents 22.5% of establishments and nearly 18% of employees. In the 
“collective” policy profile, the employers make particular use of collective pay 
practices for both managerial and non-managerial employees by combining bonuses 
and generalised pay rises (24% of establishments and nearly 23% of employees). 
The final profile bases policy on generalised pay increase and represents 11% of 
companies and nearly 9% of employees. A more detailed description of the six 
profiles drawing on the characteristics of the establishments (size, industry sector, 
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economic and competitive position 4 , workforce structure, and wage level and 
dispersion5) reveals that each compensation policy corresponds to a specific type of 
establishments (see table 3 and graphs 1 and 2). 
 
_____________ 
 
4  The REPONSE survey describes economic and competitive position with reference to the evolutions 
observed by senior management representatives over the course of the three years preceding the survey. 
5 Information on wages is drawn from annual declarations of social data (DADS) collected by INSEE. It refers 
to the net hourly wage paid by the company, including bonuses and supplementary top-up payments, net of social 
security payments. The article studies median and average wage levels and dispersion. Total dispersion (interdecile 
range of D9/D1) breaks down into dispersion at the top (above the median, D9/D5) and at the bottom of the wages 
distribution (below the median, D5/D1). 
 
Table 2. Six compensation policy profiles (as %) 
 Mixed Flexible Based  
on irre-
versible 
wage 
increases 
Collective Based  
on general-
ised wage 
increase 
Reduced % of 
establish-
ments using 
each 
practice 
% of 
establish-
ments 
17.6 10.0 22.5 24.1 11.2 14.6  
% of 
employees 31.4 9.5 17.8 22.7 8.6 10.0  
Non-managerial staff 
Generali-
sed pay 
increase 
99.8 0.0 98.9 98.3 100.0 0.1 74.7 
Individua-
lised pay 
increase 
99.9 100.0 99.3 70.1 0.0 61.3 77.5 
Individual 
perfor-
mance-
related 
bonuses 
77.5 69.2 59.1 56.7 27.4 49.9 55.8 
Collective 
perfor-
mance-
related 
bonuses 
98.4 96.2 6.4 87.7 3.7 6.9 50.9 
Managerial staff 
Generali-
sed pay 70.8 2.3 68.7 69.3 67.9 5.0 53.1 
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Source: Calculations by the authors based on data for senior management representatives in 
the REPONSE survey for 2004-2005, DARES.  
Field: Sample of 2,735 establishments of 20 employees and over in the private sector 
(excluding agriculture) with managerial and non-managerial staff.  
Note: 17.6 % of establishments implement a “mixed” policy, representing 31.4 % of 
employees. 99.8 % of these establishments state that they granted generalised pay rises to 
non-managerial staff – a proportion that is higher than average (74.7 %) 
 
Mixed policy 
The “mixed” policy is typical of large establishments that have been in existence 
for over fifty years in the energy, financial sector and to a lesser extent food 
processing industries. Such establishments are in most cases prime contractors and 
subsidiaries belonging to a group listed on the stock market. They enjoy a good 
financial health and a level of profitability judged to be higher than that of their 
competitors. While they are growing, mostly on the international market, they do 
not have a dominant market share (i.e. their share is under 50%). Their efforts to 
achieve more favourable competitive position are clear from their strategic 
objectives, which are bargained with the senior management team. These objectives 
aim for profitability, growth, and respecting budget more than is the case elsewhere. 
Mixed policy covers more often than average a relatively skilled and stable 
workforce: the proportion of managerial and intermediate professional occupations 
is often between 30% and 50% of staff and the proportion of fixed-term contracts 
under 5%. However, the proportion of temporary workers is higher than elsewhere, 
often representing over 5% of staff. This profile is related to higher average and 
increase 
Individua-
lised pay 
increase 
98.5 93.5 77.6 56.7 24.9 52.0 68.2 
Individual 
perfor-
mance-
related 
bonuses 
100.0 89.6 57.1 69.3 26.0 46.9 63.5 
Collective 
perfor-
mance-
related 
bonuses 
99.9 93.4 7.0 87.2 5.3 12.2 51.9 
Managerial and non-managerial staff 
Profit-
sharing 
agreement 
86.1 60.3 25.3 50.6 13.2 15.9 42.9 
Company 
savings 
plan 
100.0 58.0 25.4 23.1 11.8 18.3 38.7 
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median wages levels than the average. Whatever the indicator, wage dispersion is 
high, though not considerably different to that of the overall sample. The mixed 
policy profile clearly corresponds to the compensation policy of the automotive 
firm. This company makes use of the full range of pay practices and its 
compensation policy is described as generous. Individualised pays are a major part 
of its policy. For instance, non-managerial staff sometimes receives individualised 
wage of over 15% of their total compensation (excluding other bonuses such as 
profit-sharing). Allowances and bonuses make up between 15% and 30% of the 
total compensation of production line workers. Senior management does not 
distribute performance-related bonuses, but rather develops a broad range of 
financial participation schemes. Moreover, the company's compensation policy 
includes a broad range of other bonuses, particularly irreversible bonuses such as an 
additional month's pay, contributions towards transport costs and restoration, and so 
on. The firm also pays half-yearly bonuses based on absenteeism, with reductions 
for every day off up to a total of eight days. 
 
 
 
             Graph 1. Wage levels                       Graph 2. Wage dispersion 
            by compensation policy                        by compensation policy 
         
Source: Calculations by the authors based on figures for senior management representatives 
in the REPONSE survey for 2004-2005, DARES.  
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Flexible policy 
Flexible policy is characteristic of subsidiaries of business groups listed on the 
stock market in the wholesale and retail trade sector as well as the business services 
sectors. Here, the companies are generally of long standing and not being in a 
dominant position on the international market. They find it difficult to gauge how 
their business will evolve. Senior management commonly defines specific 
objectives for profitability, control of payroll increases, and market share. The 
compensation profile can be compared to the flexible pay strategies described by 
Brochard (2008): the establishments are indeed operating in a highly competitive 
market. Like the mixed policy, the flexible policy is more widespread in 
establishments with a skilled and stable workforce. Managerial and intermediate 
occupations commonly represent over 50% of staff, with the share of fixed-term 
contracts and temporary workers at less than 5%. The establishments pay average 
and median wages that are higher than elsewhere, but wage dispersion is equally 
high. The result highlights the potential for inequality in flexible and individualised 
pay practices underlined in previous research (Belfield, Marsden, 2003; Lemieux et 
al., 2009). 
 
Policy based on irreversible wage increases 
The third profile is characteristic of establishments that are typically long 
established (with often over half a century in business) and small (less than 50 
employees). They are often operating in the intermediate goods industry and, to a 
lesser extent, the construction and the non-profit sectors. A further feature is that 
these establishments are both subcontractors and prime contractors (for at least 50% 
of financial turnover). They are generally operating in a difficult economic 
environment, with a low financial turnover and a slowdown in activity. Their 
workforce is mainly male, stable, and relatively old. The average and median wages 
are close to the mean at aggregate level but wage dispersion (particularly the total 
wage dispersion and the top of the distribution) is higher. This is due in part to the 
considerable weight of individualised pay rises for both managerial and non-
managerial staff.  
 
Collective policy 
The fourth policy can be identified in establishments in the wholesale and retail 
trade sector and to a lesser extent, the food processing and consumer goods sectors. 
Unlike the previous two profiles, the establishments are commonly stand-alone 
companies working within a local marketplace. They consider their business to be 
expanding despite relatively low financial turnover. Increasing profitability is 
indeed a key strategic objective. These establishments employ a young and low-
skilled workforce: the proportion of managerial and intermediate occupations is 
often under 30% while the proportion of staff aged under 40 is over 70% of the total. 
Wage levels and dispersion are lower than elsewhere. 
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Policy based on generalised wage increase 
The fifth policy is typical of stand-alone establishments that are small and recent 
(between 5 and 9 years in business). They work in the education, health, and social 
action as well as transport sectors. Their financial turnover is also relatively low but 
they consider the future holds growth for the business and their level of profitability 
is judged higher than that of their competitors. Their activity is stable and easy to 
predict. Unlike the other profiles where financial criteria decide strategic 
orientations, this profile includes establishments that put security in work at the 
forefront of their objectives. The workforce is mainly female, low-skilled, and less 
stable than in other cases. Women represent over 60% of the total staff; managerial 
and intermediate professions are under 15% and the percentage of fixed-term 
contracts is over 5% of total staff. Wage levels and wage dispersion are both 
noticeably low. 
 
Reduced policy 
The final profile covers a wide range of very different business sectors, 
particularly services to individuals or to businesses, education, health and social, 
action sector. Focusing on the services sector, both to individuals and business-to-
business, reveals multi-site businesses that are generally small and recent, between 
5 and 9 years in business. Their financial turnover, often as part of a subcontracting 
partnership operating on the national market, remains low. Their level of 
profitability is judged lower than that of their competitors and keeping payroll costs 
low is the key strategic priority. On average, “reduced” policy applies to a skilled 
workforce with a percentage of managerial and intermediate employees that is often 
over 50% of total staff. Average and median wages are close to those of the sample 
as a whole. The use of individualised and flexible pay practices – albeit at a lower 
proportion than average – is concomitant with higher wage dispersion.  
The call centres are cases in point. The four companies studied, all prominent in 
the business services sector, are characterised by their low use of pay practices 
compared with average practices observed in the sample: pay rises are highly 
limited in this sector. The low wage levels paid by call centres shed light on a 
situation that represents a minority case within the reduced policy profile. However, 
many of their characteristics are shared by establishments within the profile, 
starting with the fact of working as subcontractors and focusing on keeping payroll 
costs low. This is reflected by their use of reversible and individualised bonuses. 
Besides they make no use of fixed bonuses such as those tied to length of service or 
an additional month's pay (thirteen month payment). Our interviews reveal that the 
proportion of bonuses is far from insignificant as it can reach 10 to 15% of the 
monthly wage. Call centres make particular use of two kinds of bonus, dependent 
on a reduced level of absenteeism and on results. These are paid either to a team, or, 
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increasingly, to an individual employee6. Bonuses based on results can sometimes 
be high compared to the monthly wage, but the union representatives interviewed 
pointed out that employees never achieve the maximum bonus on offer because the 
criteria defined by senior management are intended to keep it out of reach. 
 
Table 3. Main features of establishments by compensation policy 
 
“Mixed”  
policy 
 
“Flexible” 
policy 
 
Policy based 
on irreversible 
wages increase
“Collective” 
policy 
 
Policy based  
on generalised 
wage increase 
“Reduced”  
policy 
 
% of esta-
blishments 17.6 % 10.0 % 22.4 % 24.0 % 11.2 % 14.7 % 
% of emplo-
yees 31.3 % 9.5 % 17.8 % 22.7 % 8.6 % 9.9 % 
Range of pay 
practices 
Full range Full range with 
the exception 
of generalised 
pay increase 
Irreversible 
pay practices 
(generalised 
and individual-
ised pay 
increases) 
Collective pay 
practices 
(generalised 
pay increase , 
collective 
bonuses, 
profit-sharing)
Generalised  
pay increase 
No specific 
wage practice; 
where they 
exist, wage 
practices are 
reversible and 
individualised 
size Over 50 employees  
Less than 50 
employees  
Less than 50 
employees 
Less 50 
employees 
Sector 
Financial  
and energy 
sectors 
Retail trade 
and business 
services 
Intermediate 
goods industry, 
construction, 
non-profit 
sectors 
Retail trade 
food process-
ing, consumer 
goods 
Education 
health, and 
social action 
transports 
Services to 
businesses and 
individuals, 
education, 
health and 
social action 
Age More than 50 years 10 to 49 years Over 50 years 20 to 49 years Over 50 years 5 to 9 years 
Subsidiary 
links 
Belonging to a 
firm listed on 
the stock 
market  
Belonging to a 
firm listed on 
the stock 
market 
Stand-alone 
independent 
Stand-alone 
independent 
Stand-alone 
independent 
Multi-site 
businesses 
State of the 
market 
Growth Growth but 
difficult to 
predict 
Decline and 
unusual 
variation in 
2004 
Growth Stable Difficult to 
predict 
Subcontracting 
No No Yess, less than 
50% of 
financial 
turnover 
  Yes, more than 
50% of 
financial 
turnover 
_____________ 
 
6 This includes two categories: incoming calls taken by the employee and the quality 
of  their performance, and sales objectives in terms of outgoing calls. 
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Strategic 
objectives 
Bargained 
between the 
establishment 
and senior 
management: 
profitability, 
growth, market 
share, budget 
control 
Bargained 
between the 
establishment 
and senior 
management: 
profitability, 
growth, market 
share, payroll 
control 
 Profitability Security in 
work 
Payroll control 
Note: Each line details the main establishments’ features for each remuneration policy 
profile: for example, establishments that make use of “reduced “policy employ a more 
skilled workforce than the sample taken as a whole. Empty squares reflect a lack of 
significant characteristics for a given profile. 
 
To sum up, the most widespread policy is characterised by heavy use of a range 
of pay practices – collective, individualised, reversible and irreversible. In the mid-
2000s, this “mixed” policy applied to over 30% of employees. None of the profiles 
are characterised purely by individualisation as such; rather, all the profiles 
combine reversibility and individualisation in their own way. Each compensation 
policy profile corresponds to a given type of establishments, determined by their 
structural characteristics, competitive context, human resources management, and 
level of wages, as the case studies reveal. 
 
 
2. What connects compensation policies and wage collective bargaining?  
 
A cross-comparison between the typology of compensation policies and features 
of the wage collective bargaining process and the mobilization of our case studies 
shed light on the hypothesis of a positive correlation between bargaining models 
and diversity of compensation policies. 
 
2.1. Particular compensation policies correspond to specific wage collective 
bargaining patterns 
The REPONSE survey reveals the levels at which wage policies are bargained, 
shedding light on the existence or otherwise of a discussion or bargaining process in 
2004. It also highlights the significance of wages defined by collective agreement at 
sector-level by asking senior management representatives about the importance they 
place on sector-level recommendations and what aspects of compensation (for 
example the wage hierarchy, bonuses, and profit-sharing) are included.  
The statistics reveal a broad uptake of wage bargaining at firm-level and the 
significant role of recommendations at sector-level in wage review decisions (table 
4, final column). In 2004, nearly 43% of establishments had held a wage collective 
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bargaining process7. In over half of all cases, the bargaining process led to an 
agreement signed by all participants. However, the process ended in a unilateral 
decision by the employer in over one in four cases. In establishments where no 
collective bargaining process took place, senior management representatives gave 
three reasons: a unilateral decision by senior management (30% of cases), 
application of a collective agreement at sector-level (29%), and no request to do so 
from the employees (24%). 
Moreover, recommendations at sector-level are taken into account by nearly 
57% of establishments. In 30% of cases, they are of key importance. Other key 
criteria affecting wage decisions include directives from parent company in nearly 
50% of establishments and financial results in nearly 80% of them (table 5). 
In table 4, three forms of complementarity between compensation policies and 
wage bargaining can be discussed: firstly, the key role of collective bargaining at 
establishment-level when the policy makes use of individualisation and bonuses; 
the importance of recommendations of collective agreement at sector-level in the 
case of generalised pay rises; and the weakness of collective bargaining – at both 
firm-level and sector-level – in wage review decisions in case of “reduced” 
compensation policy. 
 
Dynamism of collective bargaining at firm-level when compensation policies are 
based on individualisation and bonuses 
The “mixed” and “flexible” policy profiles stand out in terms of the 
predominance of collective bargaining at firm-level relative to recommendations at 
sector-level (table 4). Establishments developing a “mixed” policy are characterised 
by the presence of union representatives. Here, wage decisions handed down by the 
parent company override wage recommendations at sector-level in more than two-
thirds of establishments8 (table 5). The weakness of collective agreements at sector-
level is consistent with the low rate of reference to collective agreements at sector –
level in determining the wage hierarchy. 
Establishments developing the “flexible” policy do not stand out from the 
sample as a whole in terms of collective bargaining at firm-level. Collective 
agreements at sector-level are only very rarely used to define the wage hierarchy. 
Flexible compensation is tied in with the key significance placed on financial 
results – in over 79% of establishments – when it comes to wage decisions (see 
table 5). Labour relations are poorly institutionalized, as revealed by Brochard 
_____________ 
 
7 The DARES estimate is around 50%. It is adjusted to include establishments for which 
the collective bargaining process takes place at the company, the business group, or national 
level. 
8  As demonstrated, establishments in this profile are often subsidiaries of business 
groups listed on the stock market and over half of them state that their autonomy in matters 
of wage reviewing is limited. 
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(2008): this in turn reflects the low level of unionisation (less than 5% of employees) 
and the relative scarcity of union representatives. 
 
Table 4. Collective bargaining patterns by compensation policy (in %) 
 
“Mixed”  
policy 
“Flexible” 
policy 
Policy 
based 
on irre-
versible 
wages 
increase 
“Collecti-
ve” policy
Policy 
based 
on gener-
alised 
wage 
increase 
“Redu-
ced”  
policy 
% of  
establish-
ments 
% of esta-
blishments 17.6 10 22.5 24.1 11.2 14.6  
% of emplo-
yees 31.4 9.5 17.8 22.7 8.6 10  
Presence of wage collective bargaining  
Percentage of 
establishments 
having taken 
part in collec-
tive bargaining 
or discussions 
on wages in 
2004 
52.8 44.8 47.6 44.3 26.4 31.6 42.7 
Importance of recommendations at sector-level in wage review decisions 
High impor-
tance 20.8 14.4 33 35.4 49.1 14.7 28.7 
Secondary 
importance 36.6 28.6 27.4 30.8 14.6 26.8 28.4 
Little or no 
importance 37.7 55.6 37.1 30.7 30 54.8 39.3 
Source: Calculations by the authors based on figures for senior management representatives 
in the REPONSE survey for 2004-2005, DARES.  
Field: Sample of 2,735 companies of 20 employees and more in the private sector excluding 
agriculture with managerial and non- managerial staff.  
“Mixed policy” is implemented by 17.6% of establishments and applies to 31.4% of 
employees. Of these establishments, 52.8% state that they took part in a wage bargaining 
process in 2004, a proportion that is higher than the average for the sample as a whole 
(42.7%). Likewise, 36.6% of establishments grant only secondary importance to the 
collective agreement at sector-level in terms of wage review decisions, a proportion that is 
again higher than average for the sample as a whole (28.4%). 
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Table 5. Criteria used in wage review decisions by compensation policy (%) 
Type of policy  
“Mixed”  
policy 
“Flexible” 
policy 
Policy 
based 
on 
irreversi-
ble wages 
increase 
“Collecti-
ve” policy
Policy 
based 
on 
general-
ised wage 
increase 
“Redu-
ced”  
policy 
% of  
establishments 
Primary 49.6 16.6 40.7 44.2 42.6 15.2 37.2 
Seconda-
ry 29.8 37.3 29.5 32.4 11 35.6 29.9 Inflation 
Insignifi-
cant 16.2 44.8 28.1 18.7 36.2 44.9 28.8 
Primary 66.8 79.2 65.4 66.5 40 71.4 65.3 
Seconda-
ry 21.8 10.8 15.2 18 10.6 8.6 15.1 
Financial  
results 
Insignifi-
cant 8.9 8.7 18.1 11.1 44.3 15.6 16.4 
Primary 14.3 21.2 12.4 12.2 9.3 14.4 13.5 
Seconda-
ry 39.6 36.5 30.4 31.7 21 27.8 31.5 
Comparison 
with other 
businesses  
in the sector Insignifi-
cant 42.5 40.7 55.9 50.4 63.6 54 51.3 
Primary 58.4 52.8 36.2 56 36.2 40.4 52.1 
Seconda-
ry 32.6 36.7 26.5 31 26.5 35.6 30.9 
Social  
climate 
Insignifi-
cant 6.9 9.2 29.6 11.5 29.6 21 14.1 
Primary 20.8 14.5 33 35.4 49.1 14.7 28.7 
Seconda-
ry 36.6 28.6 27.4 30.8 14.6 26.8 28.4 
Recom-
mendations  
of collec-
tive agree-
ment  
at sector-
level 
Insignifi-
cant 37.7 55.6 37.1 30.7 30 54.8 39.3 
Primary 66.5 52.3 36.4 40.8 21.8 27.9 41.5 
Seconda-
ry 9.7 8.1 6.8 8.9 7.3 4.8 7.7 
Directives  
from parent 
firm Insignifi-
cant 7.4 18.3 15.8 12.5 18.3 12.6 13.6 
Primary 36.7 31.5 46.6 52.1 54.6 37.3 44.2 
Seconda-
ry 26 22.4 24.4 21 11.1 22.2 21.8 
Statutory  
minimum 
wage Insignifi-
cant 35.1 44.9 27.7 24 29.7 38 31.6 
Source: Calculations by the authors based on figures for senior management representatives 
in the REPONSE survey for 2004-2005, DARES.  
Field: Sample of 2,735 establishments of 20 employees and more in the private sector 
excluding agriculture with managerial and non- managerial staff.  
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The key significance of collective agreement at sector-level in face of collective 
and irreversible pay practices 
Three groups of establishments are characterised by the key significance they 
place on recommendations of collective agreements at sector-level, though 
collective bargaining at firm-level may carry even more weight. The common 
characteristic of the establishments in question is that their compensation policy is 
based on the collective dimension of wages, particularly via generalised pay 
increase. Establishments that develop a policy based on irreversible pay increase 
(individualised and generalised) place key importance on wages recommendations 
at sector-level, while also organising a collective bargaining at firm-level relatively 
regularly. The rate of unionisation is low (less than 5% of employees) and the 
presence of union representatives or other staff representative bodies within the 
establishment is relatively rare. 
Companies that adopt a collective policy take part in wage bargaining at the 
same rate as the sample taken as a whole. The importance placed on the collective 
dimension of compensation can be seen in the criteria selected for wage reviews: 
recommendations at sector-level play indeed a key role in more than 35% of 
establishments, as against an overall average of 28%, and collective agreements at 
sector-level are usually used to establish wage hierarchies. Other criteria external to 
the establishment are likewise taken into account, particularly inflation and changes 
in the statutory minimum wage. 
Unlike the previous two profiles, establishments adopting a policy based on 
generalised pay increases part in wage bargaining much less often than average. 
These establishments have noticeably high levels of unionisation, but the presence 
of union representatives is lower than elsewhere. When reviewing basic wages, 
employers take into account of recommendations at sector-level, inflation, and the 
level of the statutory minimum wage. Collective agreements at sector-level are also 
a key in determining wage hierarchies and bonuses. 
 
“Reduced compensation” policy corresponds to a weak collective bargaining, 
whatever the level  
The last of the six profiles, “reduced” policy, is characterised by the weakness of 
collective bargaining both at sector and firm levels. These establishments have low 
rate of unionisation and union representatives are few and far between. Wage 
review decisions are based first and foremost on financial results and directives 
from the parent firm (table 5).  
To sum up the six profiles foreground the strong links between compensation 
policies and wage bargaining patterns. The widespread uptake of collective pay 
practices (reversible or otherwise) is associated with major significance of 
collective agreement at sector-level in wage review decisions. Collective bargaining 
at firm-level is intense in establishments that prefer to make use of individualised 
and reversible pay practices, as in the “mixed” and “flexible” policy profiles. On the 
contrary, establishments that have a ”reduced” wage policy are characterised by the 
weakness of collective bargaining, whatever the level. Apart from this last case, the 
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individualised vs. collective dimension of pay practices thus distinguish patterns of 
collective bargaining from each other. The link that might have been hypothesised 
between collective pay practices and collective bargaining in fact only holds true at 
the sector-level. Collective bargaining at establishment-level is typical of 
establishments that prefer to use individualised compensation policies. 
 
2.2 “Mixed” and “reduced” policy: the wage collective bargaining in call 
centres and an automotive firm 
The qualitative surveys carried out in the firms under study shed further light on 
the analysis by providing background context on the wage collective bargaining 
process.  
 
The case of the automotive firm: widespread uptake of collective bargaining at 
firm-level, while recommendations at sector-level remain secondary 
Collective bargaining at firm-level is the most significant feature of labour 
relations within the automotive firm. As already seen, this is the typical social 
dialogue profile for firms making use of mixed policy: regular collective bargaining 
at firm-level and secondary significance granted to recommendations at sector-level. 
One of the reasons is related to the existence of firm-guaranteed minima that 
outstrip those stipulated by collective agreements at sector-level9. Since the mid-
1970s, the firm has had its own system for jobs classification10, based on an internal 
evaluation method inspired by agreements in the metalworking industry. The pay 
scale for newly employed executive staff starts higher than the statutory minimum 
wage and the minima laid out in collective agreements at sector-level. The 
guaranteed minimal annual compensation offered by the automotive firm is 
likewise higher than the minima laid out in collective agreements and the statutory 
minimum wage: in 2009, for example, it was 25% higher than the minimum wage. 
Collective agreements at sector-level thus do not play a major role in the wage 
collective bargaining process, though they do remain a point of reference, as 
indicated by the firm wage hierarchy. 
The importance of the parent company in wage review decisions in the “mixed” 
policy profile has already been noted. The automotive firm belongs indeed to a 
business group, where parent company sets a timetable for the compulsory annual 
wage bargaining process at the start of each year. The timetable does not depend on 
events external to the group such as changes in the statutory minimum wage or 
minima stipulated by collective agreements at sector-level, since the firm pays 
_____________ 
 
9 Minima include all components of the gross wage subjected to social taxes, excluding 
premium by seniority as laid out in collective agreements at sector-level, profit-sharing 
bonuses, and reimbursement of expenses. 
10 The table was revised for executive employees in the 2000s. 
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wages that are above both types of minimum wage. For example, from 2001 to 
2009, while the value of the point 11 as defined by the collective agreement at 
sector-level for non-managerial staff rose by slightly over 5%, the generalised pay 
rise granted by the firm over the course of the same period was over 18%. 
According to union representatives, the wage increase was essentially based on the 
group's financial results and inflation. The firm simply takes note of the wage 
practices used by their main competitors to point out during the bargaining process 
either that it is inclined to be generous and pay more or that it cannot do better and 
pay the same or slightly less.  
While the compensation policy is “mixed” in that it makes use of a range of pay 
practices, all union representatives interviewed all drew attention to the fact that 
their main objective during wage collective bargaining was increasing base wage. 
Over the past ten years, the average percentage of generalised pay increases granted 
by the firm has been 1.85%, with a minimum of 1% in 2001 and 2009 and a 
maximum of 2.4% in 2008. The union representatives are campaigning for a 
benchmark to be applied to the minimum wage, linking the generalised pay increase 
in percent to a guaranteed minimum in absolute terms. The union representatives 
see this measure as a boost for the lowest-paid workers. For example, an agreement 
was reached in 2008 for raising basic wage by 2.4%, with a minimum of forty euros 
for executive staff. All employees with a monthly wage under 2,400 euros were 
thus guaranteed a rise of at least forty euros a month, which in fact worked out at 
over 2.4%. The use of benchmarking is also found in the second topic of the 
bargaining process, establishing percentages for increasing the budgets allocated to 
individual rises and promotions. The budgets differ according to professional 
category. The percentages are lower than the generalised pay increases and are 
usually around 0.7% for workers, 0.9% for employees, and 1.2% for technicians 
over the ten or so years studied. Besides the two previous topics, establishing 
guaranteed annual minima is the third components of the wage collective 
bargaining, opening the field of bargaining up to the full range of pay practices, 
including seniority bonus, profit-sharing bonuses, and so on. Over ten years, the 
increase was bargained to 37.4%, from 15,245 euros in 2001 to 20,950 euros 
in 2011, in a period when the consumer price index rose by 18.8%. These are the 
most significant aspects of the compulsory annual bargaining process, along with 
other possible issues such as potential percentage or euro increases of bonuses and 
honorary awards for long service.  
 
Call centres: How to avoid wage collective bargaining? 
Call centres providing business services are closer to the “reduced” policy 
profile outlined earlier: neither collective agreements at sector-level nor collective 
_____________ 
 
11  Multiplied by a coefficient, the value of the point establishes the hierarchical 
minimum wages for a 35-hour working week. 
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bargaining at firm-level has much impact on how wages are set. Wage decisions are 
made first and foremost in line with directives from parent company. Above and 
beyond the statistical profile, an analysis of collective bargaining practices in the 
call centres reveals strategies of avoidance and minimisation in issues of collective 
bargaining at firm-level while actively seeking out the least restrictive collective 
agreement at sector-level. Business-to-business call centres refused to be part of the 
same collective agreement as so-called integrated call centres (those that are part of 
a major firm), which mostly come under the national collective agreement for the 
telecoms industry of 26 April 2000. As companies were restructured and mergers 
and acquisitions took place, employees of externalised call centres came under 
various other collective agreements at sector-level, even though some of them still 
held exactly the same job. The “Syntec” national collective agreement of 15 
December 1987, applying to staff working in engineering, was the reference 
collective agreement for externalised call centres before the agreement for service 
providers was signed. The latter offers employees fewer advantages than the Syntec 
and telecoms agreements. For instance, rights provided by the Syntec agreement, 
such as holiday bonuses and double time for Sundays and bank holidays12 are not 
provided by the service providers agreement. The minimum gross wages laid out in 
the Syntec collective agreement are higher than in the service providers’ collective 
agreement. The hypothesis that service provider call centres operate a self-
interested selection strategy as regards collective agreements at sector-level thus 
seems fairly solid. Such a strategy reflects their intent to keep the wages on offer to 
their telephone operators – a largely female workforce – at the statutory minimum 
wage, however long they have been working (Castel, 2012). 
Unlike the automotive firm, wage collective bargaining in this sector appears 
also to have little direct impact on wages. When wages are not simply frozen, any 
rises defined by the collective agreement at firm-level are limited to the minimum 
wage decided at the sector-level and especially rises in the statutory minimum wage. 
Any discussions concerning a generalised pay increase often come to nothing. 
Union representatives then turn their efforts to a serie of small advantages that in 
this context are far from negligible, such as limiting the number of days off before 
sick pay kicks in, an extra day off in the case of the death of close family member 
or after many years of employment, increasing bonuses and revising the terms of 
their attribution, and so on. These case studies raise the question of what real role of 
wage collective bargaining at firm-level play and its real influence in setting wage 
levels.  
 
 
_____________ 
 
12 The law does not stipulate that wages should be increased for working on Sundays; 
however, sector-level or company agreements may make provision for such an increase. 
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3. What is the impact of wage collective bargaining? 
 
The REPONSE survey sheds light on the impact of wage collective bargaining 
at firm-level: more than two-thirds of senior management representatives and 
almost half of employee representatives consider that the wage decisions taken by 
senior management would have been the same even without any collective bargain-
ing process. Rather than attempting to evaluate the influence of bargaining on wage 
levels, this paper now sets out to discuss those aspects likely to limit their sphere of 
influence and potential impact. The analysis reveals the extent to which the collec-
tive bargaining process is shaped by the firm's organisational context, individualisa-
tion of pay practices and the statutory minimum wage. These aspects are not, by 
their very nature, obstacles to the collective bargaining process although they do 
seem to be used as such by participants.  
 
3.1. From the individualisation of compensation to the blind spot of    
collective bargaining  
The growing significance of individualisation and bonuses, particularly in the 
“mixed”, “flexible” and “reduced” policies and in the case studies, serves as a 
reminder that collective bargaining over actual compensation levels cannot be 
limited to just the base wage. This represents a major challenge for wage collective 
bargaining insofar as bonuses now represent a non-negligible proportion of overall 
compensation: in 2006, 12.5% of total compensation was paid as bonuses, of which 
27% was in the form of individual bonuses (Bignon, Folques, 2009). In line with 
earlier research (Meurs, Skalli, 1997; Brahami, Daniel, 2004; André, 2012), our 
analyses confirm that there is a disconnection between actual wages and the minima 
laid out in collective agreements at sector-level. This supports the hypothesis 
developed by Meurs (1996) that the rise of individualisation allows firms to increase 
their autonomy vis à vis their collective agreements at sector-level: the 
individualisation of compensation tends to weaken the influence of collective 
agreement at sector-level as employers take less note of this latter in their wage 
review decisions. At firm level, even where the bargaining process refers directly to 
the rules governing individualised pay practices (via criteria or the proportion of 
individual rises in the overall payroll for instance, as in the case of the automotive 
firm), the effective increase received by an employee depends on bargaining with his 
or her superior. According to the REPONSE data, the main focus of collective 
bargaining at firm-level is on changes in overall payroll (67% of establishments), 
followed by bonuses (43% of cases) and the proportion of individualised rises (41%). 
The criteria for granting of individual increases are little discussed, on the other hand, 
coming up in one in three establishments. The share of total compensation to be 
individualised is thus frequently determined outside the collective bargaining process.  
The case studies further highlight how the spread of individualised pay practices 
goes along with an extension of the areas lying outside the wage collective 
bargaining process, most notably via the development of training and skills 
management within the automotive firm and the spread of performance-related  
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bonuses at the call centres. At the opposite of the REPONSE survey questionnaire, 
which does not differentiate between wage bargaining practices according to 
professional categories (executives and non-executives), case studies reveal the 
extent to which the compensation of non-executive employees lies outside 
collective bargaining. In the automotive firm, for instance, only executive 
employees are concerned by the wage bargaining process, and non-executives 
employees are excluded. As indicated in the national collective agreement of March 
13, 1972, for engineers and managers in the metalworking industry, managers are 
regularly – generally on a yearly basis – given the opportunity to meet with their 
superiors to discuss promotion, career development, or a pay rise based on their 
own individual performance. Such employees have two guarantees as regards their 
compensation: guaranteed pay rises linked to length of service and guaranteed 
access to positions that offer better levels of compensation. These latter depend first 
and foremost on their level of responsibility rather than the time they put in at their 
desk, let alone on producing given commodities, as their managerial role indicates. 
Apart from the job classification of managerial staff, which stipulates guaranteed 
minima higher than those offered in collective agreements at sector-level – as is 
also the case for non-managerial employees – union representatives have no 
information on executives wages insofar as they are highly individualised.  
Wage collective bargaining theoretically applies to all employees in call centres 
but is actually relevant only for employees, technicians, and supervisory staff. 
Information is lacking on wages of management to an even greater extent than at 
the automotive firm: only a rough average is available. While the generalised pay 
rises do apply to junior managerial staff who are paid on the basis of a minimum 
laid down in a collective agreement at sector-level, each managerial employee is 
periodically invited to discuss his compensation with his own direct manager. Call 
centres coming under the collective agreement for service providers implement a 
policy that encourages career development and all managerial employees can sign 
an individual contract with his or her employer which gives more favourable terms 
than those stipulated in the collective agreement at sector-level.  
Finally one might go so far as to argue that the individualisation of 
compensation creates a blind spot in the wage collective bargaining process insofar 
as a significant portion of compensation is determined outside collective bargaining.  
 
3.2. Bargaining margins limited by the firm's organisational context 
Case studies and the REPONSE survey shed light on the impact on the wage 
collective bargaining of the constraints linked to how the firm is organised. In 
particular, belonging to a business group or being a subcontractor are two key 
aspects in understanding wage practices and collective bargaining. The REPONSE 
survey shows the significance of directives from the parent company in wage 
review decisions, particularly in cases of “mixed” policy. In the case of the 
automotive firm, the parent company not only sets the timetable for wage collective 
bargaining, but also unilaterally lays down the overall budget available, i.e. the total 
rise in payroll. The bargaining process begins with an invitation sent to the union 
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representatives at a point when the budget in question has already been set. The 
process then takes place following an agenda set by the parent company in which 
the budget is initially not available to the employees and not up for debate by them. 
The data is quasi non-negotiable by definition, as setting the budget requires access 
to strategic information. As one union representative put it, "We're not backstage 
[…] we don't know what the budget is for the wage bargaining process". This is not 
a new state of affairs in France: for employers, wage bargaining should not require 
confidential business information to be revealed (Mottez, 1966). Consequently, 
only very general indicators are given and the bargaining margin in terms of the 
business group's payroll remains unknown. A coordinated group of union 
representatives taking part in bargaining processes across the business group could 
perhaps help them to share information, thereby strengthening the weak bargaining 
position held by employees' representatives. However, there is no long-term, 
structured link between union representatives of the same union taking part in 
bargaining across the various entities of the business group.  
At the call centres, the wage bargaining process takes place at the group level, 
either at the parent company or within each regional entity. Again, the key starting 
point for the bargaining process, the consolidated financial turnover, provides little 
in the way of visibility for participants. The role of contractors, whose demands in 
matters of cost competitiveness leave call centres little room for manoeuvre, must 
also be taken into account (Castel, 2012). Given that the labour costs represent 
between 70% and 80% of financial turnover, it is easy to understand how important 
the statutory minimum wage is in establishing wages.  
 
3.3. The statutory minimum wage 
Rises in the statutory minimum wage are key for collective bargaining at sector-
level. From 2003 to 2009, its upward curve led collective agreements to bring their 
minima in line with it, particularly for workers and employees (André, Breda, 2011). 
Collective bargaining at sector-level in call centres in fact reveals that despite 
attempts by unions to achieve minima laid down in collective agreements that are 
higher than the statutory minimum wage, employers' organisations use it as a means 
of reducing the influence of collective bargaining at sector-level (Castel 2012). 
However, the statutory minimum wage influences not only decisions at sector-level, 
but also collective bargaining at firm-level: according to the REPONSE survey, 
nearly two-thirds of senior management representatives take note of changes in the 
statutory minimum wage in wage review decisions. The case of the call centres 
reveals that the wage collective bargaining timetable is indeed influenced by 
reviews of the statutory minimum wage. The bargaining process begins in mid-
March to May, thereby generally taking place before the annual revision of the 
statutory minimum wage on July the 1rst (until 2009), which led to a certain sense 
of frustration, as one union representative put it: "It's hard to put your trust in a boss. 
Last year and even the years before that, we must have said to him, ‘we want a rise, 
that's why we're here, among other things, but don't forget that the statutory 
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minimum wage will soon be going up. We want our rise to be de-correlated from 
the increase in the statutory minimum wage and in the last two or three years’, I 
clearly remember the boss saying yes at the start of the bargaining process and then 
by the end, he'd forgotten what he'd said. That's a real killer!" 
The statutory minimum wage is first and foremost a reference used to limit the 
spread of low wages in France (Caroli, Gautié, 2008). However, it is open to misuse 
and rather than a lower limit, it has become a target. In the call centres in the case 
study, the statutory minimum wage has become a tool used by employers to limit 
the impact of collective wage bargaining. It has a key role in the low collective 
bargaining margin open to employees, as one union representative regretted: "The 
statutory minimum wage is a bit of a crushing weight! Because you then ask 
yourself what's the point in collective bargaining? And what credibility do we have 
as regards the employees?" The problem is obviously not the existence of a 
statutory minimum wage per se, but rather the development of careers limited to the 
statutory minimum wage for an increasing part of employees, as a union 
representative points out: "When you hear employees saying 'I've been here for 
eight years and the statutory minimum wage has just caught up with me', then that's 
tough and it's a serious problem!" The correlation between collective bargaining 
practices and compensation policies has an impact on determining the field of what 
is available to be bargained. The analyses in this paper reveal that the scope of what 
is available to be bargained depends on the pay practices in use in the firm. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the 2004-2005 REPONSE survey and the two case studies 
confirm the correlation between compensation policies and wage collective 
bargaining patterns in France. The typology identifies six compensation policy 
profiles, from the simplest to the most complex. A cross-comparison of 
compensation policies and the wage collective bargaining process reveals the extent 
to which the impact of collective bargaining depends on the pay practices in use. It 
demonstrates how the firm's organisational context, the individualisation of 
compensation, and the statutory minimum wage can all be used strategically by 
employers to limit the sphere of influence of collective bargaining at firm-level. 
Individualisation creates a blind spot in collective bargaining whose significance is 
far from marginal, as the case studies demonstrate. The requirements of contractors 
or parent companies similarly govern or even limit bargaining margins, while the 
statutory minimum wage seems to be used as a basis for establishing wages and as a 
ceiling for careers, especially for female employees, and as a tool for avoiding wage 
bargaining for firm applying “reduced policy” (particularly in the call centres). 
While the advent of the global economic crisis in 2008 certainly played a role in 
reducing collective bargaining margins in a context where wage moderation was 
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key, it does not seem to have challenged the assessment that there is a range of 
compensation policies and associated collective bargaining patterns in France. 
Unlike what has been observed elsewhere in Europe, particularly in southern 
Europe where the crisis went hand in hand with a sudden breakdown in collective 
bargaining systems (Marginson 2012), the institutional framework for wage 
bargaining remains indeed unchanged in France. The two extremes of the range 
based on the REPONSE survey for 2004-2005 – the mixed and reduced policies – 
were both identified in fieldwork in 2010, suggesting a relative stabilisation in the 
transformation of compensation policies in France and their associated bargaining 
processes.  
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